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Abstract
Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver are Canada’s most signifi cant locations of global 
city formation today. Th eir distinctive spatial development and mobility mix were 
greatly infl uenced by decisions regarding inner-city expressway building. Th is article 
explores the hypothesis that choices made regarding how to move motor vehicles 
through Canada’s three major metropolitan areas between 1960 and 1980 can be better 
understood by examining the dynamics of global city formation in these jurisdictions. 
Montreal implemented a comprehensive expressway network to align with its 
status as Canada’s leading global city during the 1960s. Toronto’s attempt to complete 
an expressway network was partial, refl ecting fragmentary global city aspirations 
during the 1970s. Vancouver, where global city ambitions only began to form during 
the 1980s, cancelled urban expressway plans and became Canada’s ‘freeway-free’ major 
city. New insight into the structure of these cities can be gained when a global city 
analytical framework is applied to their urban expressway development experience.
Keywords: global cities, urban development policy, urban highway confl icts, urban 
transportation 
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Résumé
Aujourd’hui, Montréal, Toronto et Vancouver sont les villes globales au Canada. 
Leur développement spatial particulier et la mixité caractéristique de leurs moyens 
de mobilité ont été largement infl uencés par décisions prises dans le cadre de la 
construction d’autoroutes urbaines. Cet article examine l’hypothèse selon laquelle les 
choix relatifs au trafi c automobile dans les trois grandes métropoles canadiennes entre 
1960 et 1980, sont compréhensibles en étudiant les dynamiques de formation des villes 
mondiales dans chacune de ces juridictions.
Dans les années 1960, Montréal a mis en place un réseau autoroutier complet pour 
affi  rmer son statut de ville mondiale de premier plan. La tentative partielle de Toronto 
refl était son aspiration moyenne à devenir une ville mondiale au cours des années 1970. 
Vancouver, dont les ambitions de ville mondiale datent seulement des années 1980, 
a quant à elle annulé ses projets d’autoroutes urbaines et est devenue la grande ville 
canadienne sans autoroutes. Ce développement autoroutier inégal nous off re l’occasion 
de comprendre pourquoi les dynamiques spatiales de ces villes ont évolué selon des 
trajectoires diff érentes. Notamment en analysant le développement des autoroutes 
urbaines à la lumière des perspectives propres à chaque métropole, sur son statut de 
ville globale émergente.
Mots clés: villes mondiales, politique de développement urbain, confl its d’autoroutes 
urbaines
Introduction
Freeways or ‘expressways’ are important elements in shaping urban form and 
transportation patterns in cities (Mumford 1963; Newman and Kenworthy 1999). 
Four decades after distinct quantities and confi gurations of expressways were built 
in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, the urban transportation and development 
impacts have become apparent (Germain and Rose 2000; Frisken 1994; Kaplan 1982; 
Raad and Kenworthy 1999). We argue here that these development trajectories can 
be better understood by re-examining the forces that have shaped urban expressway 
construction in the 1960s and 1970s.  
While the eff ect of expressways on Canadian land use has resembled experiences 
across North America, the degree to which Canada’s three largest metropolitan 
centres have arrived at diff erent balances of preserving urban space and building 
expressway infrastructure during the 20th century calls for explanation. Th is article 
applies global city theory to develop a new perspective on these variations. We propose 
that the diff erent mobility development paths followed by Montreal, Toronto and 
Vancouver depend on the timing of their integration into global cultural, fi nancial 
and communication networks, which infl uenced both their capacity and motivation to 
deploy urban expressways. Our close examination of these three cities at the specifi c 
historical juncture when expressways entered the urban transportation agenda both 
illuminates their divergent paths, and sheds light on the spatial and social constructions 
of each mobility trajectory. 
Th e characteristic global city formations of Canada’s three major cities have been 
widely acknowledged domestically (Lightbody 2005) and internationally (Globalization 
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and World Cities Research Network 2012) and Canada’s major cities have long been 
recognised as having a distinctive set of characteristics (Goldberg and Mercer 1986). Each 
city regularly appears highly ranked in global ‘best city’ polls and all three are frequently 
cited by urbanists, planners and politicians as worth emulating (Economist 2011; 
Mercer 2014; Harcourt and Cameron 2007). Although still more auto-dependent than 
most European and Asian cities, Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto each exhibit lower 
automobile use and higher reliance on sustainable transport options (e.g., bike, walk, public 
transit) than any major U.S. city aside from New York (Statistics Canada 2006; Newman 
and Kenworthy 1999). When one compares whole metropolitan areas, as opposed to just 
the core, each of these three perform better in sustainable transport metrics than even the 
New York Tri-State metropolitan area (Kenworthy and Laube 2001).
Even without a national expressway building program to foster policy convergence, 
as occurred in the United States (Squires 2008), another source of exogenous infl uence 
in shaping Canada’s big city expressway development has been the drive to attain, 
retain, or forgo a recognized place among global cities. Previous research into Canada’s 
urban highway building has examined local and provincial policy dynamics (Frisken 
1994; Kaplan 1982; Bourne 2000; Pendakur 1972; Lee 2007; Leo 1977; Colcord 1987), 
including the role of community organizing, citizen activism, municipal politics and 
provincial development agendas. Th ese assessments, however, paid little attention to the 
role that global linkages and aspirations might have in Canada’s urban transportation 
decision-making. Diff ering approaches to global city formation in Montreal, Toronto 
and Vancouver can be seen to have aff ected critical decisions that were taken about 
how to respond to growing urban automobile travel during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Variations in expressway development 
Across many fi elds of enquiry, Canadian researchers have investigated developments, 
trends and outcomes in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, focusing on these three 
cities as legitimate fi elds for urban research on a global scale.  In a study of housing 
price infl ation on home ownership in Canadian cities, Harris (1986:302) wrote that 
“Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver have been selected  in part for their intrinsic 
importance.” A considerable body of urban research has accumulated that compares 
and contrasts these cities to reveal important insights into subjects as diverse as: 
immigration patterns (Hou and Bourne 2006; McDonald 2004; Newbold 1996); 
housing (Mah and Hackworth 2011; Skaburskis and Moos 2008; Haan 2005; 
Downs 1997); growth management (Turcotte and Vézina 2010; Shearmur et 
al. 2007; Tomalty 1997), and quality of life (Murdie 2008; Frenette and Sceviour 
2004; Mason 2003). We join this analytical trajectory in search of insights into the 
relationship between expressway building and the global city dynamics in Canada’s 
three largest cities.
While the kind of major road infrastructure needed to move vehicles rapidly 
through a city can be expected to exert a signifi cant impact on urban form and 
function, the eff ects of Canada’s urban road building can be harder to identify due to 
the inconsistent terminology that has been applied to their design. Unlike nationally 
planned and fi nanced highway networks (e.g., the German autobahn and U.S. 
Interstate Highways1), specifi cations that distinguish an “expressway” from other road 
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confi gurations are not offi  cially promulgated in Canada. Canadian expressways often 
blend into boulevards and other major arterial roads when they transect urban areas. 
Understanding how the expressway infrastructure that reshaped urban development 
around the world has infl uenced Canada’s cities requires a clear and comparable 
measurement of the extent to which Canadian municipalities introduced controlled 
access (i.e., no direct entry from adjacent property), fully grade-separated automotive 
infrastructure into their urban space.
We have selected the expressway as the road infrastructure category that reveals 
the clearest evidence for a priority on motor vehicle movement through an urban area. 
Expressway infrastructure has been clearly defi ned by the Transportation Association 
of Canada (TAC 1995), a non-governmental organization that promulgates “technical 
guidelines and best practices” in transport infrastructure (Transportation Association 
of Canada n.d.).  TAC’s Urban Supplement to the Geometric Design Guide for Canadian 
Roads recommends a specifi c set of physical characteristics for expressways. Th ese 
include grade separation, traffi  c volume, restricted access to adjacent lands, and 
minimum traffi  c speed2 (Transportation Association of Canada 1995: U.A. 16 – 17).  
Applying the TAC defi nition, we then measured centre-line length for expressway 
infrastructure on street maps published by Perly (1990), Rolph-McNally Ltd. (1983), 
and the City of Vancouver’s Planning Department (1991).3  Th ese maps provided 
suffi  cient detail to diff erentiate expressways from other road infrastructure. We 
assembled a chronology of all expressway infrastructure that was inaugurated within 
each city’s municipal boundary, beginning in 1958 when infrastructure that met 
the TAC expressway defi nition was fi rst introduced in Toronto.4 We then worked 
backwards, calculating a total municipal expressway length derived from maps 
published between 1988 and 1991, when expressway networks had stopped growing 
within all three cities’ boundaries, although expressway construction has continued 
in the suburban periphery of each metropolitan area. We subtracted the length of 
each new expressway segment from the city’s total in the year that it opened. Since 
Montreal’s urban boundaries changed between 1960 and 1976, we measured the 
expressway length within the current municipal boundary in eff ect during each year.5 
Toronto and Vancouver’s boundaries were unchanged throughout the period we have 
examined.
Figure 1 shows the development of expressways within the municipal boundaries 
of Montreal. After the initial segments of the Autoroute des Laurentides, the 
Trans-Canada Highway, the Decarie Expressway and the Metropolitan Expressway 
(Autoroute Métropolitaine) were opened between 1958 and 1966, these yielded 
slightly over 15 kilometres of urban expressway. But by 1967, when the International 
and Universal Exposition (Expo 67) opened, over 31 more kilometres had been 
added through extending the Decarie Expressway and the Trans-Canada Highway, 
initiating the Bonaventure Expressway, and completing Autoroute 15 to the U.S. 
border.  Following this burst of development, there was ongoing construction of the 
Ville-Marie Expressway ahead of the 21st Olympiad which added 8.8 kilometres to 
Montreal’s expressway network by 1976.
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Figure 1 – Montreal Expressway Length, 1958 - 1988 (route-km)
Figure 2 highlights a much more modest development trajectory in Toronto. In 1958, 
the 3.6 kilometres (km) of urban expressway that had been built could hardly be 
described as a network.  By 1967, 13.4 km had been added through construction of the 
Gardiner Expressway and the Don Valley Parkway. Only a further 0.85 km were added 
to Toronto’s network in 1976 with the conversion of the aborted Spadina Expressway 
into the Allen Expressway at the municipality’s northern edge.  
Figure 2 – Toronto Expressway Length, 1958 - 1988 (route-km)
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Vancouver reveals itself in Figure 3 to be virtually a control case for urban development 
without expressway building. In 1960, 4.1 km of expressway was built through the 
city’s northeast corner to connect the Trans-Canada Highway with the Ironworkers’ 
Memorial Bridge to North Vancouver. Th ere has been no further expressway 
construction within the city’s boundaries since that time.
Figure 3 – Vancouver Expressway Length, 1958 - 1988 (route-km)
Taken together, Figures 1 through 3 reveal unmistakable diff erences in the expressway 
development within Canada’s three largest cities.  Th ese data show that Montreal 
built more expressways, compared to Toronto and Vancouver. Vancouver built almost 
nothing, and Toronto created an intermediate sized network. In both Toronto and 
Vancouver, expressway building had levelled off  by the 1970s, while it continued to 
grow in Montreal, albeit more slowly.  
Th e relationship between these expressways and urban development is highlighted 
by calculating the length of expressway infrastructure per 100,000 population, as 
presented in Figure 4.  Here, the diff erent trajectories are most clearly revealed.  While 
Vancouver never increased its expressway supply beyond a minimal level, Toronto did 
add expressway infrastructure through the 1960s and then levelled off  at roughly half 
of Montreal’s expressway provision per 100,000 inhabitants. Montreal expanded its 
urban expressways through the 1970s, and because of population decline during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, discussed further below, attained the highest per capita 
level of expressway infrastructure among the three cities. Such variation raises the 
question of why Canada’s largest cities pursued such diff erent approaches to urban 
mobility, a conundrum which we explore in detail in the next three sections.
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Figure 4 – Expressway length (route-km) per 100,000 population
 in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver
Montreal’s ambitious urban expressway agenda
Montreal’s distinctive modernization mode was both enabled and shaped by Quebec’s 
break from a traditional society dominated by the Catholic church and a small 
parochial elite (Colcord 1987; Germain and Rose 2000). Th e 1960s saw the launch of 
a Quiet Revolution, characterised by Quebecers’ determination to assert their control 
over economic and social development (Charbonneau, Hamel, and Barcelo 1994; 
Colcord 1987). From 1954 to 1986 (with a three-year break in 1957) Montreal was led 
by a mayor who orchestrated the most ambitious urban growth agenda that Canada 
had ever seen. Mayor Jean Drapeau came to see his mission as advancing Montreal 
to the top tier of world cities, and identifi ed mobility as an essential element of such 
a strategy. Speaking to the Canadian Club of Montreal in 1978, he noted “… the way 
transport is assured may change but transport itself remains one of the factors which 
has the most impact on the possibility for a city to become and remain a metropolis.” 
(Drapeau 1978: 10). And Drapeau had no doubt about the scale of infrastructure 
needed to facilitate metropolitan mobility: the bigger the better. Addressing the 
Montreal Chamber of Commerce, Mayor Drapeau insisted that “Without greatness, 
there is no metropolis.” (Drapeau 1985: 7). To bolster his claim that grandeur underlay 
success, Drapeau suggested that suburban Quebecers would, when traveling abroad, 
always identify themselves as being from Montreal and not Quebec, let alone Canada. 
Montreal’s metropolitan development thus contributed much to Canada’s identity 
because, “Th e reality of a great metropolis is to become [synonymous] with its country.” 
(Drapeau 1985: 8).
If grandeur was a key ingredient of metropolitan development, then mega events 
and mega projects were an eff ective means to attain such outcomes. Drapeau held a 
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fervent belief that spectacular urban development projects and events were the best 
means of advancing Montreal’s prospects. He sloughed off  criticism for devoting time 
and eff ort to special events and legacy projects instead of focusing on the needs of 
Montreal’s underprivileged, stating: “Th e ugliness of the slums in which people live 
doesn’t matter if we can make them stand wide-eyed in admiration of works of art they 
don’t understand.” (Germain and Rose 2000: 84). 
To enable such spectacular development, Mayor Drapeau had to entice provincial 
and federal governments to fund much of the new infrastructure that would be needed, 
including urban expressways (Charbonneau, Hamel, and Barcelo 1994; Colcord 1987; 
Frisken 1994; Germain and Rose 2000; Kaplan 1982). Drapeau devoted up to half 
of Montreal’s budget to road improvements in the years leading up to Expo 67 and 
used this event to maneuver the Provincial and Federal governments into funding 
expressways (Frisken 1994). Th e Province of Quebec spent $500 million, equivalent to 
$3.5 billion in 2014 dollars, on expressway infrastructure for Expo 67 (McKenna and 
Purcell 1980: 150; Manuel 2014). Quebec invested in Montreal’s expressway agenda 
because the infrastructure that sped motor vehicles within the city would also spur 
suburban growth by opening up vast areas to residential development (Charbonneau, 
Hamel, and Barcelo 1994). While Ottawa had previously refused to pay for expressways 
in Montreal, Drapeau leveraged Expo and the 1976 Olympics to squeeze infrastructure 
funding out of the national treasury (Kaplan 1982). 
Expressway building had to unfold rapidly in order to meet the fi xed Expo 67 
deadline, meaning that construction occurred with very little community impact 
assessment and mitigation (Germain and Rose 2000). Th e Ville-Marie Autoroute 
720 began digging through downtown Montreal in 1965, along with site clearance for 
the sprawling Turcot interchange between Autoroutes 15 and 20.  Th ese two projects 
demolished 850 inner city homes.  Th e Bonaventure Autoroute 10 also broke ground 
in 1965 to provide primary access to the Expo site and opened in April 1967, just 
a week ahead of the World’s Fair.  Th e Decarie Autoroute 15 began demolitions in 
1964, with construction following in 1965 and the expressway entering service in 1967, 
fi ve days before Expo’s opening. Similarly, the Cote-de-Liesse spur to Autoroute 
20, which expanded access to Dorval Airport, began construction in 1965 and was 
completed in 1966.6
Given the imperative of impending international mega events in Montreal, protests 
against the destruction of homes and the fracturing of neighbourhoods had limited impact 
on the governments that sponsored these projects.  In contrast to Toronto and Vancouver, 
local opposition prompted little alteration in the timing or outcomes of expressway 
building. Th e only signifi cant community input was that resident and merchant groups 
succeeded in having the Ville Marie Expressway moved away from the waterfront as it 
approached the downtown core so as to reduce disruption of the port and the Old City 
(Kaplan 1982). Montreal faced the fewest political or fi scal constraints on its expressway 
development among Canada’s three largest cities because of the development dynamics 
fostered by its global city salesmanship. It thus realized the purest articulation of the 
postwar automotive mobility paradigm then in vogue among global cities. 
Montreal’s network of controlled access, high capacity urban expressways was 
intended to cement the city’s position as a modern metropolis. While Expo 67 and 
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the 1976 Olympics garnered global attention while they unfolded, these mega events 
left Montreal with the legacy of Canada’s most extensive urban expressway network. 
Writing in Th e Nation, Erwin Galantay suggested that the spirit of Expo 67 would 
be carried forward by its infrastructure legacy: “Th e excitement and élan of Expo will 
not vanish from Montreal when the temporary buildings are dismantled.… the new 
bridges and highways will remain as substantial souvenirs.” (Galantay 1967: 562).  
  
Toronto’s change of heart in the midst of expressway building 
Although Toronto would not eventually keep up with Montreal, it got off  to an early 
lead in building urban expressways, launching its fi rst such infrastructure years ahead 
of Montreal. But in contrast to “La Métropole,” Toronto’s initial expressway routes 
traversed undeveloped natural spaces (e.g., ravines) and lightly populated industrial 
areas. Th e Gardiner Expressway was opened in 1958 as the Lakeshore Expressway 
and then renamed after Metropolitan Toronto’s fi rst chairman upon its completion 
in 1964. Th is elevated expressway originated just south of Toronto’s fi nancial district 
at Bay and King Streets, and ran through industrial land, rail yards, and port facilities 
to connect with the western suburbs of Mississauga and Oakville. Th e Don Valley 
Parkway (DVP) was completed in 1964, connecting northeast suburbs including the 
master planned bedroom community of Don Mills to Toronto’s centre (Solomon 
2007; Robinson 2011). 
Ontario could fund expressways in and around Toronto during the 1960s without 
Ottawa’s assistance. But unlike Montreal, where the looming deadline of Expo 67 
demanded parallel construction of multiple routes, Toronto’s projects were implemented 
sequentially and incrementally (Filion 2000; Solomon 2007; Osbaldeston 2009). By 
the time that transportation development plans targeted established neighbourhoods 
for necessary route segments, Toronto’s residents had more direct experience of the 
expressways’ urban impact than did Montrealers at the time their infrastructure was 
being advanced. 
Th e Spadina Expressway was the next major addition to Toronto’s network. Its 
construction began in 1963, as the Gardiner and DVP were nearing completion. 
Planned to improve access between Toronto and the fast developing suburb of 
North York, Spadina’s design included an inner-city ring of feeder expressways. 
Local opposition began to consolidate during the planning for this extension of the 
expressway network. While the Gardiner and Don Valley Expressways had managed 
to avoid disrupting established communities, Spadina and its feeder expressways would 
be built through iconic neighbourhoods including Kensington Market, the Annex, 
Chinatown and Forest Hill, home to a gentrifying middle class (Ley 1988; Ley 1994). 
Expressway opponents, including Jane Jacobs, soon came together under the 
umbrella of the Stop Spadina and Save Our City (SSSOC) coalition. Because Toronto 
was not explicitly pursuing a global city development agenda as Montreal had done, 
the debate over the Spadina Expressway focused on the best way to meet local and 
regional mobility needs, rather than meeting elite expectations on what infrastructure 
a “world-class city” needed. Responding to protests about the negative neighbourhood 
impact from expressway building, Metro Toronto produced its own transportation plan 
in 1966, weighing expressway development with subway and express bus alternatives. 
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Th is plan recommended a ‘balanced’ approach that would complete the Spadina 
Expressway, and shift subsequent expansion projects to deliver transit infrastructure. 
But opponents seized on Metro’s recommendations to argue that the mobility benefi ts 
from rapid transit infrastructure developed after completing Spadina would also apply 
if transit was built instead of this expressway, with the added benefi t of preventing 
the expressway’s damage to inner city neighbourhoods (Nowlan and Nowlan 1970; 
Wellman 2006).
By 1969, construction delays and cost infl ation led to the Spadina project 
exhausting its budget allocation. As Ontario’s Transportation Ministry moved to grant 
additional funds to Metro Toronto, SSSOC challenged the decision and construction 
was halted pending a Cabinet review. Before that review could be completed, Bill 
Davis took offi  ce as Ontario’s new Premier and cancelled the project. In 1971, he 
delivered what came to be known in urban planning circles as the ‘cities are for people’ 
speech in Ontario’s Legislature, stating: “If we are building a transportation system to 
serve the automobile, the Spadina Expressway would be a good place to start. But if 
we are building a transportation system to serve people, the Spadina Expressway is a 
good place to stop.” (Sewell 1993: 179).
Following the Premier’s decision, the southern half of the Spadina Expressway 
route was abandoned along with the planned inner-ring of connecting expressways. 
Some of the transit funding that had been identifi ed in Metro Toronto’s ‘balanced’ 
transportation plan was also expended. Forty years later, Toronto is marked by both 
a patchwork of expressway routes and an incomplete rapid transit network, but the 
corridor that the Spadina Expressway would have destroyed is now a vital urban 
neighbourhood served by subway and light rail lines. Unlike the mobility balance 
envisioned by Metro planners in the 1960s, in which transit and expressways would 
complement one another, Toronto’s infrastructure decisions during the 1970s have 
yielded an outcome in which neither autos, nor transit, are viewed as eff ectively 
meeting urban mobility needs (Toronto Board of Trade 2010: 39), though within a 
North American perspective Toronto still performs better than most cities in balancing 
public transit with the automobile.
Vancouver’s detour around the urban expressway building agenda
Vancouver’s elite had long dreamed of remaking their city on a grander scale (Berelowitz 
2005; Pendakur 1972). By 1957, an agenda for urban renewal, ‘blight’ removal, slum 
clearance and transportation improvement had been formally presented in the 
Vancouver Redevelopment Study (City of Vancouver 1957). Th is report proposed 
extensive neighbourhood reconfi guration and expressway construction following the 
model then being widely pursued across the United States. Proposed construction 
would extend the existing Trans-Canada Highway through the city’s heart, bisecting 
the historic Strathcona and Chinatown neighbourhoods and then cutting through 
Gastown and running along the downtown waterfront.
During the 1960s, expressway development preparations began by municipal 
acquisition of real estate along the planned route. Across North America, postwar 
‘slum clearance’ eff orts sought to reshape cities through purchasing and tearing down 
older buildings that were seen to have outlived their usefulness. In 1970, Vancouver’s 
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most signifi cant demolitions for expressway building occurred when the historically 
black community of Hogan’s Alley was destroyed to make room for the Georgia 
and Dunsmuir Viaducts.  Th ese short feeders to a future elevated expressway were 
completed in 1972. To the municipal offi  cials who had approved their construction, 
the Dunsmuir and Georgia viaducts represented the fi rst phase of modern expressways 
that would speed vehicles to and through the central business district and along the 
city’s waterfront. But the rest of the planned expressway development never occurred.
Since Vancouver’s expressway plans triggered protest from a range of Chinatown 
businesspeople, Strathcona residents, neighbourhood groups, civic activists, and some 
local politicians, as had occurred in other Canadian and North American cities, many 
have claimed that the absence of expressways represents a victory for community 
power over technocratic planning and elite development preferences. Jo-Ann Lee 
off ers a representative interpretation of Vancouver’s detour from the North American 
urban trajectory:
Against all odds, politically marginalized residents and their 
supporters from diverse ethnic and class backgrounds, formed a 
neighbourhood organization, the Strathcona Property Owners 
and Tenants Association (SPOTA). Th eir last-ditch struggle 
to defend their homes, ways of life, and rights to place helped 
put a stop to a tri-level government program of ‘slum clearance.’ 
(Lee 2007: 382)
But Vancouver’s policy reversal looks less surprising when the resources needed for 
expressway building are taken into account. Christopher Leo (1977: 43) has written 
that: “From the viewpoint of Vancouver’s expressway backers, anti-expressway groups 
were, if anything, a somewhat less galling obstacle than was the pinch of fi nance.” 
Investing in urban infrastructure was not a priority of British Columbia’s 
government during the Strathcona Expressway’s gestation period.  From 1952 to 1972, 
Premier W.A.C. Bennett allocated billions to build highway, railroad, and hydro-
electric infrastructure across British Columbia’s hinterland to advance his Social 
Credit Party’s agenda of economic growth through natural resource development. 
Rural infrastructure was seen to have a high payoff , in both economic and political 
terms. Attorney General Robert Bonner, who represented Vancouver in the Legislative 
Assembly during these years, claimed that rural infrastructure would do more for 
Vancouver because: 
… the opening up of the interior, and development of power 
and major investment which was being attracted, was securing a 
much more rapid improvement in the lot of people than would 
have otherwise been the case…. People were getting jobs and 
opportunities in Vancouver and salary improvements; and we 
were witnessing an expansion of the city not because of what 
was going on in Vancouver, but what was going on everywhere 
else.  (Mitchell 1983: 354)
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Unlike Montreal or Toronto, Vancouver’s expressway proponents had diffi  culty making 
a case that either national or provincial prosperity would be advanced by an inner-
city expressway. Since 1972, no expressway infrastructure has been built in the City 
of Vancouver and land that had been planned for freeway interchanges and bridge 
access was turned into neighbourhoods such as False Creek and Coal Harbour. Over 
subsequent decades, the city’s population grew from 409,734 in 1976 to 578,041 in 
2006 (City of Vancouver 2011), the downtown core was built out, alternative road and 
transit infrastructure were developed and a vision of the city that embraces a ‘bright 
green future’ has become entrenched (City of Vancouver 2013). 
When the infrastructure trajectories that Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver have 
pursued are compared through the commonly used lenses of transportation policy 
and community development, these outcomes appear quite idiosyncratic. Th e results 
can be explained in part by Canada’s lack of a national transportation infrastructure 
development program, like the one that produced the U.S. Interstate Highway system 
and facilitated sprawl around urban areas. But if one takes into account the global 
attributes and aspirations of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver at the time that 
expressways were on their policy agendas, we submit that another layer of understanding 
emerges about why one city’s expressway plan was built out into a full network, another 
was scaled back considerably, and a third was abandoned almost entirely.
Considering the ‘Global City’ development dynamics of Montreal, Toronto and 
Vancouver
For a generation now, global city theory has provided a conceptual framework, perhaps 
the conceptual framework, for understanding urban development and reconfi guration 
in a post-industrial age. Drawing on Hall (1966), Friedmann (1986) and others with 
roots as deep as the early 1900’s (Geddes 1950), contemporary global city literature has 
sought to explain the relationship between urban development and global economic, 
social and cultural networks. Sassen (1991), Castells (2000), Abu-Lughod (1999), 
Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith (1999), and many others have extended foundational 
insights into a full-fl edged school of urban analysis focused on the interaction between 
global and local infl uences on cities.
Th e past several decades have seen a profusion of global city research that 
assembles information, augments interpretation, and accumulates data to build and 
reshape the theory of how global forces can change cities. While the initial phases of 
global city theory provide a sound base to build on, most of the subsequent attempts 
to capture and refi ne understandings of global city positioning, linkages and outcomes 
have focused on events and trends subsequent to the 1980s. We believe that examining 
the global infl uences on Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver back into the 1960s and 
1970s can add valuable insight into their development then and since.
Beyond shedding light on the urban expressway variation among Canada’s 
three largest cities, interrogating the infl uence of global city dynamics during this 
prologue to contemporary global city networks may help address some critiques 
of this paradigm. Th ese include the exclusion of smaller peripheral cities from the 
analysis entirely (Simon 1995; Robinson 2002); the need to recognize that all cities 
exhibit a common subset of global city characteristics (Amin and Graham 1997); the 
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challenge of explaining the heterogeneous global city formation processes that cities 
undergo (Th rift 1996); providing a deeper analysis of the inter-relationship between 
cities, regions and states (Smith 2001); and the call to expand the global city paradigm 
beyond narrowly specifi ed economic indicators (King 1991).  
Th ese critiques might be summarized as suggesting that global city theory can 
continue to be enriched by research that builds greater variety, diff erence and specifi city 
of place into the analysis. We contribute to that diversity by highlighting how specifi c 
global infl uences have diff erentiated the urban expressway construction in Montreal, 
Toronto and Vancouver. As the primary and secondary data that we present below 
make clear, Canada’s three biggest metropolitan areas occupied distinctly diff ering 
points in their global city formation at the time they faced choices on building urban 
expressway infrastructure, and they made substantially diff erent decisions about how 
to proceed. 
Building on its historical relationship with Europe and its commercial ties to the 
United States, Montreal was Canada’s biggest node in the global economy during 
the 1960s, when urban expressway building was in full swing across North America. 
Th rough the 1960s, Montreal was recognized as Canada’s pre-eminent city and its 
primary point of contact with the centres of money and power in Europe and the 
Americas.  “It was natural for industrialists and bankers (from New York and Boston) 
to come fi rst to Montreal in search of attractive investments; they would continue to 
Toronto only if they had not found what they were looking for ….” (Martin 1979: 21-
22) Montreal was Canada’s hub for investment capital to fl ow into the country through 
the mid-1960s, when Toronto’s economic infl uence began to surpass it. During the 
1970s, “Th e massive shift of Canadian head offi  ces out of Montreal (mainly to Toronto) 
… accelerated in the immediate aftermath of the election of the fi rst indépendantiste 
Parti Québécois government in 1976 ….” (Germain and Rose 2000: 2).  
Airport passenger arrivals data presented in Figure 5 reveal that Montreal was 
the primary point of contact for Canadians returning from overseas until 1967 
when Toronto surpassed it, and through the 1970s Toronto’s lead became signifi cant. 
Similarly, as Figure 6 demonstrates, Montreal was the top port of entry for non-
immigrant international visitors to Canada until 1969, when Toronto’s international 
arrivals fi rst began to exceed Montreal.  As late as 1967, Toronto received fewer than 
half of the international travelers arriving in Montreal, when the world’s attention was 
focused on Expo 67, a combined World’s Fair and celebration of Canada’s centennial 
that had a profound infl uence on Montreal’s expressway network, as previously noted. 
Th ese data underline the claim that Montreal was Canada’s pre-eminent global 
city with its most substantive international connectivity through the 1960s when it 
gave way to its Anglophone rival. Th is global city formation was both spurred by and 
resulted in its comprehensive inner-city expressway building eff orts that Toronto did 
not have the capacity to replicate. Th ese data support the claim that Montreal was 
Canada’s pre-eminent global city with its highest density of international connectivity 
through the 1960s, after which Toronto took the lead as Canada’s most globally 
connected metropolis. But by the time that Toronto had become Canada’s leading pre-
eminent centre of global industry and fi nance, the decision to stop further inner city 
expressway building had already been taken.  
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Figure 5 – Canadian residents returning from overseas air travel 
by port of entry, 1958 – 1984
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics: Call #66-201 (1958-1970); Statistics Canada: Call #66-201 (1971-
1972); Statistics Canada: Call #66-001 (1973-1984). 
During the 1950’s and 60’s, when most of its expressways got built, Toronto 
showed considerable attributes supporting its reputation as Canada’s ‘Second City.’ 
Toronto lagged behind Montreal in its global city aspirations and formation, and did 
not fully emerge as an international economic node in economic networks until the 
latter half of the 1970’s. Th e election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976, with an avowed 
agenda to take Quebec out of Confederation triggered a wave of capital fl ight and 
marked the start of a relatively abrupt relocation of globally focused businesses and 
investment from Montreal (Albert 1980; Germain and Rose 2000; Semple and Green 
1983; Semple and Smith 1981).  Th is rebalancing of Canada’s fi nancial centre of gravity 
was concretised when the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada moved 
most of their operations to Toronto in 1975 and 1976 respectively, although their 
registered headquarters remained in Montreal. Th is meant that all fi ve major Canadian 
banks (Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of Montreal, Scotia Bank, TD Canada Trust 
(Toronto Dominion Bank at the time) and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
became functionally centred around Toronto’s Bay Street (Rice and Semple 1993).
Th e fi nancial sector’s relocation from Montreal to Toronto was mirrored by 
corporate moves in other sectors. Between 1970 and 1981, Toronto saw huge gains 
in resource, manufacturing, service, utility and fi nancial sector company headquarters, 
while during that same period of time Montreal haemorrhaged such corporate 
command centres.  As shown in Figure 7,  no other city in Canada (including Vancouver) 
exhibited signifi cant aggregate gains or losses in corporate relocations during this 
period, meaning that Toronto’s gain in corporate offi  ces came overwhelmingly at 
Montreal’s expense (Semple and Green 1983; Semple and Smith 1981). 
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Stock exchange transaction data demonstrate a similar rebalancing between 
Montreal and Toronto during the 1960s and 1970s. Th e two cities were on relatively 
equal footing in terms of issues traded into the 1960s. Although there were considerably 
more issues traded in Toronto, more of Canada’s major corporations were listed in 
Montreal. Both exchanges were among the busiest in North America with a 1958 
ranking of  “… second [Toronto] and fourth [Montreal], respectively, … in terms of 
share volume and third [Toronto] and sixth [Montreal] in terms of dollar volume” 
(Walter and Williamson 1960: 313). By 1976, Montreal accounted for only a quarter 
of stock market transactions in Canada, and its share fell further to about ten percent 
in 1982. Although Montreal’s share of transactions on Canadian equity exchanges rose 
again to almost 20 percent, it was back down to ten percent in 1998 (Shearmur 2001: 
222 - 224).
Courchene (2001) shows that Toronto’s fi nancial and corporate leadership 
functions were further entrenched following free trade agreements with the United 
States, and later Mexico (e.g., NAFTA). Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating 
through the 1990s, Greater Toronto became Canada’s economic epicenter, the 
preferred location for Canadian subsidiary headquarters and by far the most globally 
integrated urban region: 
Toronto and the GTA had to make a key transition—from a 
national economic capital with a signifi cant international reach 
to a full-blown global city intimately tied to NAFTA’s emerg-
Figure 6 – Visitors from overseas countries entering Canada through air travel by 
port of entry, 1963 – 1984
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics: Call #66-201 (1963-1970); Statistics Canada: Call #66-201 (1971-
1972); Statistics Canada: Call #66-001 (1973-1984).
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ing geopolitical reality. …. As a percentage of Ontario’s GDP, 
international exports increased from just above 30% in 1981 to 
over 50% in 1998, while interprovincial exports, also just above 
30% in 1981, fell to under 20% in 1998. (Courchene 2001: 160)
While Toronto was fully connected into global economic networks only in the late 
1970s, Vancouver had few global city attributes and fewer aspirations of attaining 
these until well into the 1980s and the hosting of Expo ’86. Even afterwards, despite 
some international real estate investment, there is little evidence of global economic 
integration in corporate headquarters, fi nancial services, stock exchange or foreign asset 
location, even through the 1980s (Olds 1995; Semple and Green 1983). Vancouver 
only became identifi able as a genuine global city aspirant during the 1990s, driven 
by infusions of Asian capital and initiatives by federal and provincial governments 
to create a ‘Pacifi c Gateway’ that would further the growth of Western Canada’s 
trade, natural resource, real estate and tourism sectors. Th is gateway function would 
be fostered through major infrastructure investments to facilitate movement through 
Metro Vancouver’s port facilities, already the biggest in Canada (Marr and Paterson 
1980; Easterbrook and Aitken 1988; Pomfret 1993; Olds 1995; Todd 1998; Germain 
and Rose 2000). 
As the above evidence demonstrates, inner-city expressway building was in high 
gear across North America at a time of diff erentiated economic and social transition 
in Canada’s two largest cities and a period of economic stability in Canada’s third 
Source: adapted from Semple and Green (1983). 
Figure 7 – Corporate headquarter relocations by sector, 1970-19817
CJUR winter 24:2 2015 107
Urban Expressways and Global City Formation in Canada
largest city.  During the 1960s and 1970s, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver were in 
very diff erent places in their relationship with global economic and social forces. Th is 
became refl ected in diff erent local abilities, appetites, and agendas to assemble the 
capital necessary to build urban transportation infrastructure. With Canada lacking 
a national road funding mechanism, in the way that America’s Interstate Highway 
program funded expressway building in all American cities8, these diff erences in global 
city formation were translated into distinct outcomes in expressway infrastructure.
Conclusion: What Canada’s divergent urban expressway building reveals
Th e evidence presented above helps explain both how and why Montreal, Toronto and 
Vancouver pursued diff erent paths in their expressway development during the 1960s 
and 1970s. In the absence of both a federal highway building program and a national 
urban planning framework, these diff erences reveal much about the eff ect that global 
networks of trade, fi nance, and communication had on expressway deployment in 
Canada’s three largest cities. Indeed, the transportation outcomes in Montreal, Toronto 
and Vancouver cannot be fully explained without appreciating how the decisions about 
local transportation were infl uenced by global urbanization dynamics. 
Building urban expressways requires signifi cant sums of capital. Without an 
established federal funding source, Canada’s municipalities had to obtain funding 
mainly from provincial governments. Each major Canadian city pursued expressway 
fi nancing in ways that refl ected its global city status, or lack thereof. Montreal’s civic 
elite, led by Mayor Jean Drapeau, had no inhibition in aiming for the global gold that 
could be leveraged by becoming the host city for international mega-events like Expo 67 
and the 1976 Summer Olympics. Such engagements precipitated commitments from 
the province of Quebec and the government of Canada to help fund the infrastructure 
that were seen as prerequisites for these events’ success. Th rough the mega-project 
legacy, Montreal gained Canada’s most complete urban expressway network, enabling 
mobility that matched its aspirations as a top tier global city. 
Toronto’s municipal leaders did not aim as far beyond their borders as Montreal 
in crafting a strategy to fund urban transportation infrastructure. Toronto looked to 
the Ontario government to help fi nance its expressway and rapid transit development. 
Toronto’s leadership was not yet prepared to pursue the global engagement that their 
counterparts in Montreal had mastered as a means of securing funds from senior 
governments. Local opponents of the Spadina Expressway mounted an eff ective 
opposition that reshaped the provincial transportation agenda, and in the absence of 
any federal government commitment to expressway building, that change proved to 
be decisive in convincing the Ontario government to turn off  the tap of funding for 
urban expressways.
Vancouver was peripheral among the global circuits of capital during the 1960s and 
1970s.  Th e British Columbia government, which fi nanced virtually all of the province’s 
road infrastructure at the time, had other priorities for the period that expressway 
building was on the city’s agenda. Th e narrative behind Vancouver’s rejecting urban 
expressways has subsequently been elevated into civic legend: the plucky everyday 
people who saved the city from itself. In many ways, this story is genuine and the 
courage, commitment and success of these eff orts should be celebrated. But was the 
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civic activism that occurred in Vancouver really that much more potent than the 
protests in Toronto and Montreal? Or was it the politico-economic context in which 
those protests were made that diff erentiated the outcome?
While citizen opposition in Strathcona and Chinatown was certainly well-
organized, the evidence points to a somewhat overlooked limitation on Vancouver’s 
expressway development capacity. Vancouver’s expressway proponents lacked both a 
global lever to secure capital and any level of priority for investment within British 
Columbia’s provincial government. Once Vancouver emulated Montreal’s global city 
development strategy by securing an Expo in 1986 and the 2010 Winter Olympics, 
the urban transportation agenda had changed. Vancouver’s infrastructure legacy from 
Expo 86 is a rail transit corridor (SkyTrain) that connects the city with Burnaby and 
New Westminster, and the 2010 Olympics legacy is another rail transit corridor that 
serves Richmond and Vancouver International Airport with Canada’s fi rst airport 
train service, the Canada Line (Ferguson, et. al. 2011). 
Canada’s global city attributes and aspirations thus had a symbiotic relationship 
with urban expressway building during the second half of the 20th century.  In the heady 
post-war years of the 1950s and 60s the automobile was in both the most rapid phase 
of its ascendency and also the least critiqued stage of its infl uence on the environment 
and culture.  Th ese mobility dynamics made the urban expressway a natural component 
of global city aspirations.  When such global city aspirations predominated, the allure 
of international status and the fl ows of money, goods, and people that went along 
with it tipped the scales toward sinking public capital into urban expressways. When 
global city development agendas were nascent, and expressway protests were mounted 
by inner city populations, established neighbourhoods were largely left undisturbed. 
Transportation planners, elected offi  cials and citizen activists each exerted infl uence 
on deliberations over adapting Canada’s urban space to mass motorisation. But the 
diff erent positions of global city formation during urban expressway building in 
the 1960s and 70s contributed to an important diff erence in the outcomes for, and 
subsequent trajectories of Canada’s three largest cities. 
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Notes 
1  For examples of precise defi nitions that are consistently applied across a national 
highway network, see the U.S. Federal Highway Administration’s Highway 
Performance Monitoring System, Appendix B.  Available at: http://www.fhwa.dot.
gov/policyinformation/hpms/fi eldmanual/appendixb.cfm  Accessed May 11, 2014.
2 As specifi ed in the TAC manual, “Expressways carry large volumes of all types of 
vehicles at medium to high speeds …. Access to adjacent lands is prohibited to provide 
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a high level of service for through traffi  c. Expressways normally carry traffi  c volumes 
in excess of 10,000 vehicles per day.…. Th e normal range of design speed is 80 km/h 
to 110 km/h. Th e average running speed under free-fl ow conditions ranges from 60 
km/h to 90 km/h.”
3 “ScaleMaster Pro” was used for cartographic measurement of the expressway lengths 
on each map. All scales were converted to metric measure. While calculating lane 
kilometres could have off ered a more nuanced assessment of urban expressway 
construction patterns (though in our view unnecessary), the detailed engineering 
drawings required to obtain these measurements could not be obtained in their entirety 
from municipal archives. 
4 In Montreal, the chronology drew upon announcements of expressway openings 
in Th e Montreal Gazette (Hayes 1966; Hayes 1967) and a compilation of provincial 
autoroutes published by Quebec’s Transport Ministry (Transports Quebec 2013; 
2012). For Toronto, we relied upon attributed (Baker 1964) and unattributed coverage 
of expressway expansion in Th e Globe and Mail (1958; 1962; 1964; 1966; 1976). And 
in Vancouver, Th e Globe and Mail (1960) and the British Columbia Ministry of 
Transportation and Highways (2014) provided the date of the city’s sole expressway 
opening.
5 In 1963, Riviere des Praries was annexed by Montreal.  In 1964, the village of Saraguay 
was annexed and in 1968, Ville St. Michel was absorbed by the City of Montreal.  No 
further annexations occurred until 1982.
6 A concise history of these expressway developments is available at Th e Roads of Metro 
Montreal, http://www.montrealroads.com/roads/, accessed July 4, 2013.
7 Financial sector represented in $1,000,000 assets; Manufacturing, Resource, and 
Service sectors represented in $1,000,000 revenues.
8 Th e post-war American highway-building phenomenon reached its fi scal apogee 
with the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act (also known as the Interstate Highway Act) 
which made $25 billion available between 1957 and 1969 for highway expansion. Th is 
funding would amount to approximately $1.9 trillion in 2010 dollars. Ninety percent 
of these superhighway costs were covered by the Federal treasury and the program 
was presided over by a massive highway building bureaucracy in the Federal Highway 
Administration (U.S. Department of Transportation 2008; Rose and Mohl 2012). 
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